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Abstract. In this short essay, we discuss some basic features of cognitive ac-
tivity at several different space–time scales: from neural networks in the brain
to civilisations. One motivation for such comparative study is its heuristic value.
Attempts to better understand the functioning of “wetware” involved in cognitive
activities of central nervous system by comparing it with a computing device have a
long tradition. We suggest that comparison with Internet might be more adequate.
We briefly touch upon such subjects as encoding, compression, and Saussurean
trichotomy langue/langage/parole in various environments.
Keywords: Internet, servers, brain, neurons, neural networks, memory, lan-
guage.
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Introduction
In several recent research papers and surveys by neuroscientists (cf. [1], [29],
and references therein), it was suggested that cognitive functions of the brain are
performed using not only, and perhaps even not mainly, complex networks of in-
teracting neurons (connectionist view), – but also on the level of individual, highly
specialized neurons and their intracellular mechanisms. This argumentation went
hand in hand with the critique of popular analogies between brains and computers,
where neurons were supposed to work as, say, electronic logic gates.
In order to retain the heuristic power of computer science in cognitive neurobi-
ology and simultaneously to keep the door open to such paradigm extension, we
consider in this paper possible analogies between the brain and Internet, in which
certain neurons and some specific neural networks are being compared with entire
computers, in particular, with servers, that in fact do have a very rich internal
hardware and software reflected in their functions in the net.
As so many basic ideas and technologies of the information age, the future role
of the World Wide Web was presciently understood by Alan Turing. Although the
1
2Internet of course did not yet exist then, according to a convincing interpretation
by B. Jack Copeland ([4], p. 30), Turing’s definition and study of oracle machines in
his PhD thesis (1938) introduced the notion that computability may involve getting
“oracular” data from outside computers.
In this essay, we do not discuss any philosophical problems related to such com-
parisons (for possibly related discussions, see e. g. [14], [3], and references therein).
We simply try to suggest plausible and verifiable conjectures about functions,
interconnections, and dynamics of various neural structures in the brain using the
brain/Internet metaphor. Comparison with computer was already exploited in the
enthusiastic book by Jeff Hawkins [11] (cf. further developments in [12], [10], [13].)
Another subject matter concerning us here is the cognitive activity of civiliza-
tions. Looking for cognitive network patterns at this level is not a standard preoc-
cupation of the historians of culture and sciences, but one of us first engaged in this
line of thinking when researching available data on the development of writing, cf.
[24].
Our departure point is a simple remark: although WWW is very complex, the
knowledge about its structure and functions is available on all levels since it is
constructed and developed by means of engineering, cf. the first section below.
Contrariwise, brains are products of evolution, we can observe their structure and
functioning at various spatial and temporal scales, but we can only venture some
guesses about their modes of data processing. AI might be and in fact was a great
inspiration for such guesses.
Important role in this circle of ideas is played by the notion of information trans-
mission. Generally, we imagine a source of data, which can be encoded, transferred
as a message through a certain channel, received at the other, and then decoded to
reconstruct the initial data.
Using a Saussurean terminology, we can say that protocols at the transmit-
ter/receiver ends constitute a language (la langue), whereas each case of transmis-
sion is an act of speaking (la parole).
There are many mathematical models of information transmission materialized
in the IT domain. What we want to stress in this note is the fact that actual
transmission must often be relayed: data at the receiving end become, after re–
encoding, data at the sender along another channel, and so on. This involves
the rules and protocols of translation in linguistics. Usually, basic parts of such
protocols are accessible as bilingual dictionaries, but even in human societies there
3are exotic exceptions such as drum languages of various ethnic groups of Africa,
New Guinea, etc.
Thus, there must exist many neural languages, each used in respective neural
networks, and connected by numerous translating neurons/networks.
Finally, the speed with which the brain can solve cognitive problems related to
speech generation and recognition (or such a marginal activity as playing chess)
unambiguously testifies to the abundance of highly parallel processing in neural
networks. Neural organization of such parallel processing must be a very essen-
tial logistical task. This was long ago recognized and described by neuroscientists
dealing with mechanisms of visual perception.
Here we must stress that mathematical theory of time complexity of parallel
processing practically does not exist, and in any case did not reach maturity com-
parable with those of Kolmogorov complexity and polynomial time computations.
Therefore a better understanding of high parallelism in the brain might serve as
a useful heuristic tool for theoretical computer science as well: cf. [17] and many
other studies of visual cortex.
Acknowledgements. Yu. I. Arshavski in his ample correspondence with Yu. Manin
discussed and clarified for us various problems of modern neuroscience and the
relevant problems of AI. Earlier articles by and email exchanges with Nora Esther
Youngs, Carina Curto, and Vladimir Itskov were also very stimulating. We are
cordially grateful to them.
***
This essay is organized as follows. After a brief survey of the global structure of
WWW, we discuss the following subjects:
• Architecture of WWW and the role of search engines.
• Chips, computers, and servers vs neurons and neural networks.
• Kolmogorov–style compression vs. Charles Darwin–style compression.
• Miscellany.
Computer networks: Architecture
When describing the information pathways in computer networks, specifically,
the Internet, one has to keep in mind that communication between network nodes
4(individual devices, be that special-purpose servers, personal computers or network-
enabled electronic devices) can be considered on several different levels (cf. the OSI
model, [31] and [31] [OSI1] where the respective levels are called layers). From the
lowest level concerned with transferring of raw bits between two neighboring devices
to the highest level that operates in terms of such operations as remote file access
or search engine queries, each layer has its own semantics and serves as a medium
for the next higher layer. On the lowest levels of the hierarchy, each device can
communicate only with its immediate neighbors. On the intermediate levels, the
complexities of networking are hidden, and nodes can directly address their requests
to specific other nodes (identified by IP addresses). Finally, on the highest levels,
the notion of a network node is also hidden, and they operate in terms of services,
such as a named file share or a particular search engine.
What makes this transparency possible is the existence of ”routing protocols”
encapsulated in a special class of Internet servers called routers. Without getting
into details, routers keep exchanging information they learn about network nodes
existing in their neighborhood. Since the network configuration keeps changing
(as nodes come up on and drop off the network, as new subnets are added and old
ones reconfigured), the routing information is never complete, always to some extent
outdated, and often contradictory. The robustness of communication between nodes
is only achieved by the routers’ ability to retry delivery of lost messages using
different routes. What is most interesting for us here is that even considered on
this level, Internet possesses a (varying with time) map of itself, in particular of its
own topology. This map is approximate, somewhat fuzzy, partially delayed, and
decentralized. Perhaps it can be likened to the living organisms’ proprioception.
From the point of view of information processing, we should look at the appli-
cation level of the OSI model. As in the brain, information enters the network
through peripheral nodes, i.e., mostly consumer devices where people type in texts
and upload images or videos. Some of it stays local, of course, but some of it trav-
els on the network to be stored, transferred to other peripheral nodes (e.g. email)
or, most interestingly, processed, digested, summarized, and transformed. We can
discern several types of memory-like subsystems in the network.
1. Storage systems. These are places (server farms) built to provide the archival
and backup functions to the users, such as DropBox or Google Drive. They are
probably the least interesting type of network ”memory,” returning exactly what
was put in there on a specific request to retrieve it.
52. Internet archives, such as the Wayback Machine. It crawls the web and stores
the current copies of the sites it visits, without overwriting the older versions. Thus,
it allows one to reconstruct the history of web’s dynamics, though in an unavoidably
patchy form.
3. Internet search engines. Search engines started as simple keyword retrieval
databases of the important information gleaned from the web but have evolved into
powerful associative memory-type services. What’s most interesting about search
engines is that they increasingly perform deep analysis of both the content they
index and the search patterns of the users, attempting to serve ever more complex
and fuzzy user queries. There is an understanding that to effectively respond to
difficult informational queries, a search engine has to possess at least a rudimentary
type of world knowledge, such as Google’s Knowledge Graph and similar systems
developed by other search companies.
Note that a significant portion of world knowledge (perhaps, the vast majority)
in such systems is harvested from the web, rather than being manually entered.
Search engines perform many different analyses of the content they index, like
news aggregation (do these two news articles talk about the same event? if so,
who are the event actors?), sentiment analysis (is this a positive or negative news
story?) or image recognition (what objects are in the photo?).
Search engines represent the kind of information storage that is inherently capa-
ble of self-reflection. As a rudimentary, but highly visible example consider several
incidents where a search engine’s algorithms would make a funny or offensive mis-
take in response to a query, which would become a news item, and then very soon
the results it would return to the same search query would prominently feature news
about its own mistake in what could be perceived as a form of self-deprecating hu-
mor.
Neural systems:
experiments, measurements, and self–perception
The only direct information channel to one’s neural system for each human being
is self-perception, including memory, emotions, conscious sensory perceptions (”I
see” means ”I know that I see”).
Objective information about neural systems of other people, but also of animals
belonging to different species is obtained in laboratories and clinics, but this is an
outsider’s information.
6Bridging together insider’s and outsider’s views has always been and remains a
great challenge. In particular, clinical and scientific interpretation of the data of
psychology and psychiatry can be hopelessly caught in the trap of suggestion: cf.
a very convincing study of the history of psychoanalysis in [2].
Attempts of such bridging based upon computer metaphor were numerous. Be-
low we will briefly survey some of the conjectures summarized in Yu. M.’s paper
of 1987 “On early development of speech and consciousness (phylogeny)”, see [18],
pp. 169–189.
Basically, it was conjectured that the brain contains inside a map of itself, and
that some neural information channels in the central neural system:
a) carry information about the mind itself, i.e., are reflexive;
b) are capable of modelling states of the mind different from the current one, i.e.
possess a modelling function;
c) can influence the state of the whole mind and through that the behavior, i.e.
possess controlling function. ([18], p. 179).
It was remarked also that that this reflection of the brain inside itself must be
unavoidably coarse grained.
This is made much more precise in the already invoked above OSI (Open Sys-
tems Interconnection) models of the Internet, where both the notion of the network
node and protocols of their communication are subdivided into “horizontal” lay-
ers (seven in [31] [OSI1]). The lowest layer represents the topology of physical
medium transmitting “raw bit streams,” whereas the highest layer represents the
most coarse-grained vision of the whole network. Each layer has its own com-
munication language; each individual transaction (information transmission) on a
particular layer can involve multiple transactions on the next lower layer and, in
turn, serve as a part of a transaction on the next higher layer. Thus, information
transmission of the highest layer data is mediated by multiple translations down to
the lowest layer at the source, a corresponding translation up at the destination and
potentially multiple partial up and down translations at the intermediate points.
We stress again that streams of bits on the wire directly represent only the
lowest-level communication. In order to decode higher-level transactions, one would
inevitably have to ascend the hierarchy of languages, aggregating multiple lower-
layer conversations into a single higher-layer conversation: there is no way to di-
rectly jump from the lowest to the highest layer. The same is true about the
7electrochemical messaging in the brain: individual trains of neuronal spikes do not
directly represent thought or perception patterns. This is of course well understood
by experimental neuroscientists who use expression ”signature of . . . ” in articles
summarizing their findings (cf. [16], [30]).
As WWW, the mind can contain several dynamical reflections of itself, differently
positioned with respect to the functions of mutual reflection and control. The
respective functional modes of the mind manifest themselves in a wide variety
of dissociative phenomena: multiple personalities, automatisms, fugues, hypnotic
phenomena, etc.
Concrete implementations of fragments of multilayered structure in the brain are
evident, for example, in the studies of processing of sensory information of different
modalities. The way from a sensory input to the appropriate neural network in
the respective projection area should be imagined as “vertical” information transfer
from lower layers up. On the other hand, integration of different modalities, storage
of the compressed form of this information etc. should involve a considerable role
of horizontal conversation.
In the human brain, anatomy of neocortex involves several (six) layers, and Jeff
Hawkins made a series of conjectures about storing and processing information
inside and between these layers (see [11], pp. 42, 237–245). In Yu. Arshavski’s
opinion (private communication), at least part of these conjectures can be or have
been experimentally verified, but the general association of these anatomical layers
with processing layers is hardly justified.
We believe that understanding of such phenomena as cognitive maps of spatial
environment [8], mirror neurons [9], or concept cells [27], [28], can benefit from a
purposeful search of WWW-like layers and decoding their languages (cf. [29], [1]).
Information about these layers might also enrich the current rigid juxtaposition
of “purely connectionist” paradigm and the “intracellular” paradigm, according
to which cognitive processes are primarily served by chemistry and genetics of
specialized cells rather than by firing of individual neurons connected into networks.
It seems clear that memory must involve chemistry and genetic structures and
cannot be based solely on network dynamics.
Information, compression, computation
Civilisational layer of cognition. In [20], one of us argued that cognitive
processes in the human brain might and ought to be theoretically considered also
8at one level above the individial brain, namely, on the civilizational layer.
Nodes of this layer are individual brains but also, starting with early modernity,
it is enriched with libraries, laboratories, research institutes, etc.
Comparison of this layer with (more formalized conceptually) layers involving
primarily computers was based upon the following suggestion. Let us focus on
physics, science that dominates today our understanding of the universe along the
vast spectrum of spatiotemporal scales.
It is a common knowledge that physics discovers “laws of nature” that are ex-
pressed by compact mathematical formulas. These laws of nature can be then
used for prediction/explanation of results of observations (say, in astronomy) and
of experiments, and also for engineering projects.
It was suggested in [20] that each physical law might be considered as an analogue
of a computer program. Such a program computes the output after accepting
results of observations as an input. These outputs are “scientific predictions”. The
classical example consists in predicting observable positions of planets using models
by Ptolemy, Galileo, Newton, Einstein, etc.
This process might also involve other laws/programs, multiple relaying, encoding
and decoding that converge at an additional civilisation layer node, etc.
As a contemporary example, consider the recent news that the international
team of scientists using LIGO (Laser Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observer)
was able to detect gravitational waves and identify their source: two colliding black
holes.
Roughly speaking, gravitational waves resonate with light waves, because high-
frequency oscillations of space-time curvature (caused by gravity) cause the entire
system of light-like geodesics (which in the first approximation determine the light
propagation) to oscillate at the same frequency.
The basic “physical law” involved in this event consists of Einstein general rela-
tivity equations and its solutions of a special type (black holes).
At the node of observations, a large sample of other “physical laws” is invoked
that determine engineering decisions needed to construct the big observational de-
vice called LIGO which detects very small frequency changes of laser beams using
the interference techniques.
Finally, at all stages, actual computers are used, whose inputs and outputs rep-
resent “vertical” communication between an upper and a lower level involved in
9this observational activity.
Mathematical models in computer science: computability, complexity,
polynomial time. It is well known that the mathematical theory of computability
was created in the 1930s and 1940s in several different versions: Turing machines
(engineering metaphor), Church’s lambda–calculus (linguistic metaphor), Markov’s
algorithms (conveyor belt metaphor), Kolmogorov–Uspensky’s algorithms (infor-
mation flow chart metaphor), partial recursive functions (operadic metaphor) et
al.
All these versions differ in many respects. First of all, their respective domains
of inputs and outputs viewed as Bourbaki-style structures are different: finite se-
quences of bits (zeros and ones) for a Turing machine, finite words in an arbitrary
fixed alphabet for a Markov’s algorithm, and words of a language which is the ba-
sic object of lambda–calculus. Second, programs for particular computations are
formalized differently as well: a finite list of inner states of pairs (head, head input)
for a Turing machine; a finite word expressing the sequence of basic operations on
recursive functions together with their inputs etc.
Nevertheless, it was proved that all these constructions produce “one and the
same” notion of computability, in a well-defined mathematical sense. One of the
most remarkable events in the nascent computer science occurred when one of the
founding fathers stated his famous “Church’s thesis”: the computability notion is
absolute and does not depend on the chosen model of computation (if the latter is
broad enough).
This thesis is not a mathematical theorem: it can be called an “experimental
fact in the Platonic world of ideas.”
The next great discovery in this domain was that of “Kolmogorov complexity.”
If a model of computability and the suitable programming language are chosen,
then one can prove the existence of the best compressing program U with the
following properties.
(a) Let Q be an arbitrary object in the domain of this computability model or
else, a description of a partial recursive function, U a semi-computable function.
Define the complexity of Q with respect to U as the bit length of the shortest object
P such that U(P ) = Q (or, respectively, Q is a program of computation of the same
function). In other words, P taken as input of U produces Q as its output. Such a
P always exists.
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(b) There exists a class of optimal choices of U such that a different choice of
the universal programming language and/or of another U leads only to a possible
change of complexity (as function of Q) by a bounded additive constant.
Intuitively, this shortest object Q is best imagined as a maximally compressed
form of P . Thus, we may say that Newton’s classical laws of celestial mechanics
F = G
m1m2
r2
, a =
F
m
are maximally Kolmogorov-compressed representations of programs that can cal-
culate and predict future positions of celestial bodies, where observations of their
current positions are taken as inputs.
Arguably, this Kolmogorov compression metaphor gives a widely applicable pic-
ture of scientific knowledge, when it is restricted to one of many timescales of
natural phenomena: cf. [15] and the LIGO story.
In the papers [23] and [21], it was argued that brains actually also use neural
codes allowing good compression of relevant information.
One set of arguments suggested that such a compression of, say, dictionary of the
mother language in human brain can explain the well-known empirical observation,
Zipf’s law.
This “law” (in fact, a keen and very general observation) states that if one ranges
lexemes in the order of their decreasing frequency of usage in a representative corpus
of texts, then the product of lexeme frequency by the lexeme rank is approximately
constant. In [23] it was argued that a good mathematical model of such behaviour
is furnished by the L. Levin’s probability distribution, if one postulates that Zipf’s
ranking coincides with (an approximation to) Kolmogorov’s complexity ranking.
The fact that Kolmogorov complexity in strict mathematical sense itself is not
computable cannot refute this conjecture. In fact, successive approximations to
Kolmogorov complexity ranking can be obtained by a version of the well-known
ranking algorithm.
Consider, for example, encoding and storing in the brain of the vocabulary of
a mother language. We suggest that when a new lexeme is being encoded in a
brain memory network, the length of this encoding (Zipf’s “effort”) is compared
with lengths of previously encoded lexemes, and the lexeme acquires its temporary
Zipf’s rank.
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Another set of arguments combined the discussion of neural encoding of stimu-
lus spaces in [6] with suggestions of [30] that dynamics in neural networks shows
signatures of criticality. “Criticality” here means that, within a certain statisti-
cal model of the relevant network, this dynamics happens near a phase transition
regime. But it was discovered in [25] that search for good error-correcting (“noise-
resistant”) codes generally involves activity near a phase transition curve, even
though the relevant statistical model does not coincide with the one in [30]: in fact,
it again involves Kolmogorov complexity.
Stretching the metaphor further, we can also consider human communication
occurring in natural language in the same light. A natural language message is
usually treated as carrying information. But it also can be treated as a program
that runs in the brain of the receiver and whose purpose is to create a certain
mind state in it. This interpretation is particularly interesting for literary texts,
especially poetry, because their purpose is not conveying information, but rather
imparting an emotional state to the reader. It is customary to state that successful
poetry compresses its language and, consequently, if one wants to fully explicate the
“meaning” of a good poem, an extensive prose text has to be written. So perhaps
the right way to conceptualize a great poem is to say that it represents a maximally
Kolmogorov-compressed representation of the target mind state.
In the theoretical computer science, besides complexity as the length of a short-
est program, an important role is played by various embodiments of the notion
“length/time of computation.” From this viewpoint, we are interested in minimiz-
ing time necessary for producing the output from an input. The most accomplished
theory here led to the so called “P/NP problem”. Roughly speaking, if there ex-
ists a computation of a function which requires time polynomially bounded by the
length of input, can one also find this computation using polynomially bounded
time?
More precisely, in a model of the universal NP problem we consider all Boolean
polynomials F with arbitrary number of variables, and ask the question, whether
a given polynomial takes value 1 for some values of its arguments.
If the answer for F is positive, this fact can be proved in polynomially bounded
time (wrt the length of F ) by starting with an appropriate Boolean vector x and
then calculating the value F (x) = 1. But can we find this x or else find another proof
that F takes value 1 in polynomially bounded time? This is the P/NP problem the
answer to which answer is not known.
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What is relevant for our discussion here is the fact that if we allow parallel com-
putations in our models, such as parallel computation of all values of any given
Boolean polynomial by starting with all inputs of given length simultaneously, then
the P/NP problem will obviously have the answer P=NP. Thus, economy in com-
putation time can be achieved by allowing multiple parallelism.
This, in addition to program compression, might be another crucial mathematical
idea that materializes in large networks, both in brains and in civilizations.
Returning to the intuitive idea of compression, we want now to argue that there
is another type of compression which we will call here “Darwinian compression.”
Darwinian compression. Charles Darwin’s Beagle voyage was one of the
defining events in the development of human civilization because it has radically
changed our collective self-perception.
Narrowing our focus to see better his method from the viewpoint of its cognitive
characteristics, we can say that Darwin started with collecting a vast database of
living creatures. The contemporary ideology of data mining could suggest us that
his next step would be the search for correlations in this database and discovery of
various degrees of their possible interrelationships. However, this kind of research
was essentially done before Darwin: Carl Linne´ introduced the binary classification
system (genus/species) and created the principles of taxonomy that are still widely
used.
Darwin’s great breakthrough consisted in guessing how this diversity could have
occurred and what factors could determine the origin, development and change of
genera and species. The possibility to compress his intuition in just two words, “
natural selection,” motivated our metaphor “Darwinian compression”.
But in reality, one cannot rigorously derive, say, the evolution theory from ge-
nomics: all our attempts and arguments are of vague qualitative nature, at best
convincing us that the two sets of laws are compatible. A succinct and very expres-
sive description of this baffling situation was given by Svante Pa¨a¨bo in his book
[26]: ‘The dirty little secret of genomics is that we still know next to nothing about
how a genome translates into the particularities of a living and breathing individ-
ual.’ Hence we cannot say which genomes would define “the fittest” individuals
that, according to the Darwinian metaphor, have better chances for survival and
reproduction.
Attempts to fill this gap led to the development of “epigenetics,” which is study-
ing factors and developmental processes that modify the activation of various genes
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without changing the genetic code sequence of DNA: cf. [32]. Such epigenetic pro-
cesses in a chromosome can lead to the appearance of stably heritable phenotype
traits, which then can play their own specific roles in Darwinian evolution.
Another example of a scientific discovery of a similar cognitive type is the Peri-
odic Table of chemical elements (Mendeleev 1869) which embodied a compression
of a huge database of alchemical and later chemical observations, experiments, and
guesses.
Both discoveries, evolution and periodic table, can be considered as a way of con-
necting various floors of scientific knowledge referring to various space-time/complexity/
scales. Each floor is governed by its “laws” in the sense described above, which in
principle should be used to generate the laws of the next floor.
But, as in the case of Darwinian evolution, one cannot rigorously derive the
periodic table from the quantum theory of elementary particles and fields, and one
cannot rigorously derive, say, observable properties of water, ice, and steam from
the position of H and O in the periodic table.
More precisely, quantitative theory of atoms of the lightest elements consisting
of a minimal number of elementary particles might be accessible (with the help
of modern computation resources), but the whole structure of the table (including
isotopes) and the very notion of molecules and their “chemical” properties, with its
continuing extensions and ramifications all the way up to DNA encoding, remain
the “upper-floor” science, not really reducible to the science “one floor below.”
This is why we find so naive (and potentially dangerous) the claim by Chris
Anderson, Editor in Chief of the “Wired Magazine”, expressed in the title of the
cover story “The End of Theory: The Data Deluge Makes the Scientific Method
Obsolete” (summer 2008):
The new availablility of huge amounts of data, along with statistical tools to
crunch these numbers, offers a whole new way of understanding the world. Corre-
lation supersedes causation, and science can advance even without coherent models,
unified theories, or really any mechanical explanation at all. There’s no reason to
cling to our old ways.
For more detailed arguments, cf. [22].
Addendum. Several weeks after completion and acceptance of this article for
publication, our attention was drawn to the beautiful book [33]. It presents the
history of humanity based upon the same metaphor as ours, but the book is much
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wider in scope because it does not restrict itself to the study of only cognitive
networks. The Great Silk Road and Plato’s Academy, Confucius and Martin Luther
become routers and routes of the great web of civilizations.
We conclude this survey by the quotation from [33]:
“ [ . . . ] cultural evolution is Lamarckian, that is, acquired traits and skills can be
passed on over generations. Information – how to speak a language or how to make
people trust you – is transmitted from brain to brain, from generation to generation,
without the slow process of genetic mutation and natural selection. This accelerated
pace of cultural evolution made it possible for some groups of humankind to get
the jump on others and to destroy their structures and appropriate their resources.
This does not often happen in biological evolution because it is slower: even the
most complex creatures evolve so slowly that others usually have time to adapt. ”
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